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1.  INTRODUCTION 
A key argument made by several economists with respect to decentralisation 
reform is that it can reduce poverty. This assertion is based on the view that it leads to 
improvements in public sector services delivery. The efficient provision of public goods 
by the local governments may occur because of their ability to take into account local 
determinants while providing services, such as health and education [Oates (1972)].  It 
may also be due to competition, as local governments encourage the provision of efficient 
public services to, and lower tax burdens on the lower strata of society [Brennan and 
Buchanan (1980)]. 
Decentralisation has gained acceptance as a reform policy in many countries (e.g., 
Vietnam, Argentina, Colombia, Tanzania, India, Tunisia, Brazil, Bolivia, Indonesia, 
Ghana, and Mexico, inter alia),
1
 following the realisation that complex political–
economic and social issues might not be effectively handled by central government only 
[Rondinelli and Cheema (1983)]. It is widely believed that locally elected governments, 
imbued with fiscal and administrative authority, may perform far better and with more 
efficiency in terms of development, planning, and the provision of public services than a 
remote and centralised government. In supporting this argument, Manor (1999) considers 
decentralisation as an effective policy tool that may help in addressing issues such as 
regional inequity and disparity, poverty, and political instability.  
However, opponents of decentralisation believe that it creates economic 
inefficiencies, increases social inequality, and adversely affects social service 
provisions [Slater (1989); Samoff (1990); Tanzi (1995); Blair (2000)]. Samoff 
(1990), for example, shows that decentralisation, when used as a policy tool, has 
largely been a worldwide failure. Supporting that conclusion, Slater‘s (1989) study of 
Tanzania illustrates that decentralisation failed to enhance local capacities in 
implanting local programmes.  
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472 Manzoor Ahmed 
On the question of any direct effect of decentralisation on social services delivery 
and redistributive polices, the empirical literature is divided. Throughout the body of 
empirical work, the relationship of these indicators is not well elucidated. Nonetheless, 
whatever scant research has been done needs to be carefully reviewed. For example, Von 
Braun and Grote‘s (2000) work with respect to the cases of India, China, Egypt, and 
Ghana finds a negative relationship between decentralisation and expenditures on social 
services geared toward the poor. However, West and Wong (1995) note that 
decentralisation, given its flawed design (i.e., more focus on federal–provincial fiscal 
relations, and local governments are left entirely at the mercy of the provinces), is the 
prime cause of regional inequality and poverty in China. 
Faguet (2004) examines the consequences of decentralisation on poverty at the 
national level.  His results indicate how decentralisation affects the pattern of 
investments on social sectors and the formation of human capital. His argument 
supports the common assertion that decentralisation changes the pattern of public 
expenditures to focus more on the provision of services that are related to poverty 
alleviation. 
Martinez-Vazquez (2001) shows that decentralisation may also alter poverty levels 
by changing the composition of public sector expenditures. As part of the various 
redistributive schemes, public resources that are given directly to poor individuals may 
augment their incomes. In any case, pro-poor public expenditures affect poverty, even in 
the absence of direct resource transfers to the poor. For example, with decentralisation, 
public expenditures relating to basic services such as health and education will increase. 
Since these services are fundamental to human development, fiscal decentralisation is 
likely increase the welfare of the poor.  
In Pakistan, in order to decentralise the administrative and financial matters to 
the local level, a devolution plan was launched in 2001 that brought large-scale 
changes to governance and public finance of Pakistan, where several important social 
and economic services were devolved to local governments. Such drastic changes 
could bring a widespread transformation in nature, extent and magnitude of the 
essential social and economic service provision to common people. Apparently, the 
local governments because of their proximity and accountability to local people were 
more efficient and effective in increasing services that should benefit the local 
community particularly the poor and disadvantaged. Nonetheless, in spite of the 
importance of the matter the related literature has not provided a systematic and 
robust research on this issue using Pakistan as a case. This paper aims to fill this gap 
in the literature through a systematic theoretical and empirical research. The 
empirical results show that after the devolution plan in 2001 the social and economic 
services delivery has increased and improved.   
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of the 
local government system and its evolution in Pakistan. Section 3 presents a legislative 
bargaining model on federalism. Section 4 discusses the hypothesis, data and 
methodology for empirical investigation while Section 5 presents and describes the 
results. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT  
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SYSTEM IN PAKISTAN 
The local government system introduced in the Sub-Continent in 19th century by 
the British India government aimed, primarily to privilege local elites. The local 
government under the British Raj was not empowered, as it was not democratically 
elected. Instead, the central bureaucracy nominated the representatives of the local 
governments [Venkatarangaiya and Pattabhiram (1969)]. The system ran through an 
extreme ‗top-down‘ style with circumscribed functions of local representatives. The key 
administrative role at the local level was performed by the agents of the central 
bureaucracy, the Deputy Commissioner, and other bureaucratic operatives, such as the 
Assistant Commissioner, Tehsildars, Naibdehsildars and Patwaris [Tinker (1968): 
AERC (1990)].  
However, after the independence, during late 1940s and in the 1950s an ever-
increasing centralisation gave birth to a powerful military bureaucracy that diluted the 
already limited sub-national governments [Waseem (1994); Talbot (1998)]. Similar to 
pre-partition style, local bodies system in the 1960s was overwhelmingly controlled by 
the central bureaucracy through its appointed officials at the local level who had the 
discretionary power to restrict any kind of action the elected representatives might desire 
to pass or implement. During the 1971-1977, the local governments, however. were 
pushed to the background and hence remained dysfunctional.  
The local government system revived with the arrival of the military dictatorial 
regime again in 1979, where the political and administrative structure similar to the 1960s 
of over centralisation of administrative and economic power at the provincial and federal 
levels was implemented. It is interesting to note that with the death of Zia-ul-Haq and 
subsequently with the advent of democracy in 1988 after party-based general elections at 
both federal and provincial levels, the local governments were dispensed with. Thus, until 
the 1999 the local governments were in dormancy.  
However, after the 1999 military coups d'état, the local government system was 
once again reinstated but this time with entirely different structure, functions and 
responsibilities under the auspices of the devolution plan of 2000-01. 
The devolution plan clearly spells-out the expenditure and revenue raising powers 
and responsibilities of all three tiers of local governments. They were entitled to allocate 
and disburse resources according to their own priorities apparently without strong 
interference or direction from the upper tiers of governments (federal and provincial). 
However, Bahl and Cyan (2009) believe that in practice the provincial governments very 
often exercised control over certain expenditure areas, particularly on expenditures 
undertaken through ―conditional transfers‖ from the provinces.           
Another significant change accompanying the devolution plan was the 
introduction of a formula-based system of resource sharing between the provincial and 
local governments. All four provinces constituted their respective Provincial Finance 
Commissions (PFC) in 2001 to formulate the resource transfer mechanism and 
distribution of finances between the provincial and the local governments. The resource 
distribution criteria between provincial and local governments under the PFC is  
elaborated in Table 1. 
Table 1 
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Intergovernmental Resource Transfer Criteria 
Total Pool and Distribution Criteria Punjab Sindh KPK Balochistan 
Local share of the Provincial Divisible Pool 39.8% 40% 40% 31% 
Formula Factors with Weights 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Population 75% 50% 50% 50% 
Backwardness of District 10% 17.5% 25%  
Tax  Collection Effort 5% 7.5%   
Fiscal Austerity 5%    
Area    50% 
Development Incentive/ Infrastructure Deficiency 5%  25%  
District Governments‘ Deficit Transfers  25%   
Source:  Shah (2004) and Sindh (2004). 
 
As illustrated in Table 1 population was the most important criterion used by all 
provinces in resource distribution. Under the Local Government Budget Rules (2002), the 
local governments had the power to formulate their budgets and prioritise public 
expenditures without the legal consent of the provincial governments. The same rules 
categorically elaborated the procedure for budget making and its approval from the 
concerned local council. The local governments made the budgets once the provincial 
government informed the former about their share under the PFC. It was mandatory for 
the local councils to budget both development and non-development expenditures. The 
funds allocation for development expenditures were undertaken after meeting the non-
development expenses. 
 
3.  A LEGISLATIVE BARGAINING MODEL OF  
FISCAL FEDERALISM 
Consider an economy where there are two provinces, A and B; additionally, there 
are two districts, i = {1,2}, within each province. Individuals differ in their inherent 
labour productivity, denoted by si, which is distributed according to the density function 
γi(s). An individual‘s wage rate, wisi, is linear in the productivity parameter. An 
individual of type si, residing in district i of province A, receives utility from private 
consumption ci(si) and a district-specific public good, Gi; conversely, that individual 
receives disutility from the labour supply ℓi(si). For simplicity, we assume Cobb–Douglas 
preferences. 
 … … … … (1) 
We denote the B district with ~. In other words, the utility of a type-s individual in 
district i of province B is 
 … … … … (1ʹ) 
An individual of type si in district i of province A receives an after-tax wage income, 
as well as a federal transfer b; both are used for private consumption: 
 … … … … … (2) 
     iiiiiii Gsscsu ln)(1ln)(ln)(ln  
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where τ is the federal income tax rate. Consequently, in province B: 
 … … … … … (2ʹ) 
We will suppress the ~ when there is no ambiguity (i.e., when we calculate the 
derivations for province A, and can always obtain the corresponding quantities for 
province B by adding ~). We assume the district-specific wage rate to be linear in that 
district‘s development expenditure, Di, and that the ―base wage‖ w  are the same across 
districts—namely: 
 … … … … … … … (3) 
 … … … … … … … (3ʹ) 
 
3.1.  Economic Equilibrium 
Maximising (1) s.t. (2) we derive the labour supply function and the corresponding 
indirect utility function: 
 … … … … … … (4) 
, … (5) 
where 
 … … … … … … … (6) 
 
3.2.  Government Budgets 
Each province is given a budget, R and , by the federal government, to use on 
development expenditure and the public goods in each of the two districts: 
 … … … … … (7) 
 … … … … … (7ʹ) 
The federal government collects tax revenue from wage income and distributes it 
to the provinces, in addition to providing the federal subsidy. 
 … … … … (8) 
where 
 … … … … … (9) 
3.3.  The Provincial Legislative Bargaining Game 
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We assume a simple alternating-offer bargaining game, as in Marsiliani and 
Renström (2007). Take province A, with two elected representatives (types and ). If 
district 1 is the larger of the two districts, we assume that district 1 makes the first offer. 
District 2 can accept or reject it. If district 2 rejects it, then one representative is chosen at 
random to make the final offer. (The game could be extended to several rounds, without 
altering the qualitative properties.) In the final round, if district i is chosen to make the 
final offer, it will maximise its own utility subject to (7), thus implying the setting 
Dj = Gj = 0. Maximising (5) subject to (7) provides the optimal level of development 
expenditure and of the public goods when the entire budget is used in district i, and the 
resulting indirect utility function is: 
 … … … … … … (10) 
 … … … … … … (11) 
, … (12) 
where 
. … … … … … … (13) 
If district 2 is not chosen in the final round, then since G2 = 0, it follows that 
V2 = 0. If district 2 is chosen in the final round, the utility is given by (13). If we denote 
the probability that district 1 is chosen as p, then the expected utility of district 2  entering 
the final round is: 
 … … (14) 
Thus, district 2 accepts any proposal that satisfies 
 (15) 
When district 1 makes the first offer, it maximises its own utility, subject to both 
(15) and (7). 
 
Note that this problem can be written as: 
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The first-order conditions imply that (9), (10), and (11) hold for the respective 
districts evaluated at R1 and R2, respectively. R2 is chosen at the level where (17) holds 
with equality—that is: 
 … … … … … … (18) 
 … … … … … … (19) 
 … … (20) 
for i = 1,2 and 
. … (21) 
Equations (18)–(21) completely characterise the bargaining equilibrium as a 
function of the provincial budget R, the federal tax rate τ, and the benefit rate θ. The same 
equations are obtained for province B, using the ~ notation. 
 
3.4.  Federal Decision-Making 
We characterise the situation where one district within one province dominates at 
the federal level. That situation can occur when the finance minister comes from one of 
the provinces. The finance minister decides the allocation to the provinces, R and , 
taking into account the bargaining game at the provincial level, so as to maximise its own 
utility. At first, it could look as if the finance minister would set R for the other province 
to zero. This is not the case, as production there would then stop, and no taxes could be 
collected from that province. Instead, it is optimal to maximise the net tax revenue from 
the other province. Suppose the finance minister comes from province A; then,  is 
chosen so that 
, … … … … … … (22) 
subject to (4), (9), (18), and (21). 
The first-order condition to (22) gives  as a function of τ, θ, w, etc. 
R
~
 = (τ, θ, w) … … … … … … … (23) 
Differentiating (23), and evaluating within a symmetric equilibrium (where the 
two districts within a province are equal), we obtain 
. … … … … … … (24) 
Notice that by (6), b = (1 – τ) θ; then, 
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Where the second equality follows from (6)—i.e., from b = (1 – τ) θ—and the last 
equality from Equation (24). Then, we have: 
Proposition: In the bargaining equilibrium, the ratio of the local expenditure to 
the total expenditure is increasing in the federal government transfer rate that 
inherently enables the provincial governments to allocate more resources to the 
local governments. 
The proposition implies that if the transfer rate, b, is larger, then decentralisation is 
greater.  Larger allocations to subnational governments increase the expenditures on 
sectors and subsectors that are pro-poor. Thus, it is worthwhile to note that unlike a 
conventional approach that would consider counter-productive the role of subnational 
government in redistribution, we instead postulate that subnational governments is both 
effective and productive in making redistributive policies.  
 
4.  HYPOTHESIS, DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1.  Hypothesis 
We postulate that since the local governments are more responsive to local 
people‘s needs because of being accountable to them, the pattern of investment may be in 
the favour of those sectors that can deliver benefits to the poor. Given this, the paper tests 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: Ceteris paribus, after the decentralisation, pattern of public 
investment changes and sectors related to social services provision receive more 
expenditure. 
 
4.2.  Data  
Data (as reported in Table 2) are drawn from various sources including the FBS 
(various issue), provincial governments budget documents (various years), SPDC (2010, 
2007, 2012), State Bank of Pakistan (2010) and Pakistan Economic Survey (Various 
Issues). For provincial population estimates, we divide total population on in four 
provinces based on their shares in 1998 census.  Provinces in Pakistan are largely 
demarcated on ethnic/linguistic bases and inter-provincial migration is negligible. 
Therefore, it is plausible to expect that the population share of the provinces is virtually 
time-invariant. In addition, we use population as an independent variable.  The same 
variable is used to obtain per capita expenditures of the provinces.   
In order to get public expenditures, per capita income and other variables in real 
terms, their nominal values are deflated with the GDP deflator. An annual time series 
dataset from 1975 to 2008 is constructed,  because the local governments completed their 
four years tenure in 2008 and next elections were suspended until the time of writing. The 
reported data are annual because budgetary allocations to both provincial and local 
governments were undertaken annually and the data are available on annual basis. The 
cross section comprises all four provinces of Pakistan.  
Table 2 




Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Devolution Reform (Dummy) 136 0.235294 0.425751 0 1 
Decentralisation  136 0.087414 0.069814 0.01 0.37 
Population (in Millions) 136 28.08185 23.86578 3.59 90.07 
Per Capita GDP 136 4008.559 1264.578 2239 7686 
Agri. Value Add.* 136 1136.948 288.9449 696.9466 1948.867 
Civil Work * 136 20.8603 85.585 0.3527 842.806 
Pop. Per Bed 136 1508.684 171.6524 1269 1963 
Welfare Expenditure* 136 0.731106 1.011983 0.00322 6.941837 
Public Health Expenditure* 136 2.116858 3.431105 1.01345 19.11971 
Social Sector Expenditure* 136 43.49989 50.24139 1.191492 249.2615 
Education Expenditure* 136 44.64446 47.66713 1.126267 223.6559 
Health Expenditure* 136 9.672765 10.01052 0.231037 40.75399 
Irrigation Expenditure* 136 5.469899 4.801413 0.177114 24.1072 
Rural Development Expenditure* 136 1.794452 5.016514 1.22011 39.68176 
* Value Expressed in Per Capita term.  
 
The data limitation at district level and beyond restricted our analysis to provincial 
level. Since the provincial governments‘ expenditure largely reflect the local 
governments‘ expenditure—as shown in the Table 2—virtually the local governments use 
40 percent of the total provincial expenditures, hence local governments‘ expenditures 
are reflected at overall provincial expenditures. Therefore, it may be plausible to use the 
provincial level data for local level analysis. Further, the financial expenditure at 
provincial level provided similar information for both pre and post devolution plan that 
enables us in detecting the impact of the devolution plan reforms.   
 
4.3.  Methodology  
Following Faguet (2004), Faguet and Sanchez (2008) and Aslam and Yilmaz 
(2011)  we identified nine sub-sectors of public sector which could impact the living 
standard of local communities in general and the poor and marginalised social groups in 
particular. (These sectoral variables are described in Appendix A).
 
Normally the social 
service/public good provision is ‗measured in quality adjusted units of output, separated 
by the type‘ [Faguet (2004), p. 876]. Given the data constraint, we measured the real 
investment quantity in terms of public expenditures on these sectors. This approach 
although restricted us from analysing the effectiveness of the Devolution on the quality of 
delivery of the public goods. It enabled us in comparing the pre and the post Devolution 
in terms of the inter-sectoral resource allocations and the pattern of public sector 
investments.  
The dependent variables are the inflation-adjusted annual per capita amount of 
investments undertaken in each sector. ‗Population per bed‘ variable is not expressed in 
per capita term. The primary independent variable is the Devolution Reform, which is 
captured by a dummy variable that takes 1 on 2002 and afterward (2002 to 2008) and 
zero otherwise (i.e. from 1975 to 2001). Following Neyapti (2010), per capita GNP is 
used to proxy for the overall level development. Arguably population – which is an 
important time-variant factor— can affect the extent and magnitude of the social services 
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[Aslam and Yilmaz (2010)], and regions/provinces , where the more populated areas 
receive better treatment than less populated ones. 
The following model is constructed and statistically estimated using a panel 
dataset (34*4): 
 
Secit     (  it  )   2(PDumit  )   3( Dumit)   4(Devit)    5(Popit)                           6(GDPit)  ei   it 
 … … … … … … (26) 
The subscripts (it) stand for province i at time t. (Secit) alternatively represents all 
sectors included in the analysis. (FDit) is the expenditure decentralisaion. (PDumit) is the 
provincial dummy and (YDumit) is the year dummy. The provincial and time dummies 
expectedly capture all of the characteristics associated with the provinces at a given time. 
(     ) is the dummy variable for the devolution plan. The Devolution dummy (     ) 
represents the role of local governments and other institutions that came into effect after 
the devolution plan. (     ) is the population of the provinces expressed  in million  and 
(     ) is real  per capita GDP described in 1980 constant price terms. The per capita 
GDP of provinces is expected to control for the overall economic condition of the 
provincial economy among other things. The  impact of province level per capita GDP 
and expenditure on social and economic services is expected to be positive: higher 
average per capita income of one province may lead to increase in the expenditures on 
above services because of the additional resource availability to that province from own 
revenue sources.  
 
5.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
For each service, a Fixed Effect model is estimated separately and results are 
reported in Table 3. We find that the devolution plan  variable is significant and positive 
(negative sign for population per bed as expected) across all social and economic 
indicators. In above equation the positive coefficients of        (  ) and       (  ) 
suggest that the expenditures on that service have increased at a faster rate as compared 
to the pre devolution period, ceteris paribus. This leads us to conclude that the 
decentralisation has been effective in terms of increasing the expenditures on social and 
economic services.  It therefore suggests that the devolution reforms on average have 
been effective in provision of social and economic services provided to local 
communities. Thus, it is plausible to conclude that following the devolution, the 
magnitude of all nine vital socio-economic services has increased.  
As the major objective of the decentralisation to local levels was to make the 
public services accessible to the local people and the improvement of social 
infrastructure, it is reasonable to group the included services into two broad categories: 1. 
economic services and 2. social services. The economic services include development 
expenditures on sectors such as agriculture, civil work, water management and rural 
development, whereas the social services include health, education, water supply and 
sanitation facility, and social welfare and recreational services 
. 
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Determinants of Public Expenditures on Rural Development, Agriculture and Civil Work, Education, Basic Healthcare  
Indicators, Water and Sanitation, Social Welfare and Water Management 
Variables 
Pub. Exp. 
Rural Dev.  
φ  ψ 
Agri.  V. 
Add ψ 





φ  ψ 
Pub. Exp. 
on Basic 





and Sani. φ  ψ 
Public Exp. 
On Social 
Welfare φ  ψ 
Public Exp 
Irrigation.  
φ  ψ 


















Devolution Reform (Dummy) 10.69** 0.303*** 5.434*** 3.733*** 3.094*** -297.3** 55.79*** 5.272*** 3.079*** 
(5.068) (0.093) (1.036) (0.192) (0.159) (12.401) (10.083) (0.527) (0.225) 
Fiscal 
Decentralisation 
0.817** 0.820** 0.753* 0.275*** 0.249*** 0.399** 0.868*** 0.268*** 0.861*** 
(0.457) (0.344) (0.391) (0.713) (0.754) (0.488) (0.090) (0.074) (0.091) 
Population 0.0474 0.00694*** 0.00701 0.0176*** 0.0086*** 2.569*** 0.846*** 0.0236** 0.0164*** 
(0.379) (0.002) (0.021) (0.006) (0.003) (0.326) (0.209) (0.011) (0.005) 
Per Capita GDP 0.00148 0.000134*** -0.000803** 0.000183**  0.026*** -0.007** -0.0005*** 0.000015* 
(0.004)  (0.000) (0.0334)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 2.213 6.588*** 5.346*** 2.538*** 1.452*** 175.1*** 36.54*** -0.707 1.861*** 
(12.901) (0.087) (0.963) (0.217) (0.113) (12.910) (9.369) (0.489) (0.209) 
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 
R2  (Within) 0.1678 0.8807 0.5832 0.9563 0.9753 0.9875 0.7105 0.9003 0.9490 
R2  (Between) 0.1693 0.0121 0.2980 0.492 0.8590 0.9007 0.8347 0.120 0.6256 
R2  (Overall) 0.1693 0.4461 0.4475 0.9027 0.8628 0.2553 0.6430 0.6458 0.6668 
F/WaldChai2 1.57 (0.09) 20.45 
(0.0000) 










φ Value expressed in log form;  ψ values are in million Rs.; Panel regressions have robust standard error in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.0 
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The relationship between public expenditure with education and decentralisation 
variables is positive and significant. Healthcare variables (annual expenditures on 
healthcare and population per bed) maintain positive (negative) and strongly significant 
coefficient vis-à-vis the decentralisation indicators, suggesting that health services have 
increased in both quantity proxied by expenditures and quality proxied by population per 
bed after the devolution reforms. 
The impact of decentralisation on local level is not limited to social services. 
Likewise, the economic services such as agriculture, infrastructure development (proxied 
by civil work) and water management have registered a marked improvement in post 
devolution period. 
Interestingly, these outcomes are in accordance with our theoretical prediction; 
that is, socio-economic services may be better provided by the sub-national government 
as compared to their central counterpart. In the same vein, it is also in the line of the 
empirical literature [for instance, Faguet (2004)] that shows that the local governments 
because of the better local knowledge are more effective in providing these social 
services.  
As  far as other explanatory variables in the regressions analysis are concerned, the 
per capita GDP is positively correlated with education expenditures. The population 
variable has showed either unexpected (negative) sign or appeared insignificant vis-à-vis 
all socio-economic services except health indicators. The negative coefficients of the 
population in relation to services like education, water and sanitation and civil work 
suggest that the per capita investment on such services were higher in Balochistan. This 
may explain that in Balochistan with very vast land and disperse population the per capita 
cost of providing a certain social or economic service remains much higher as compared 
to other provinces.  
In general, the overall fit of the regression models is consistent with the 
decentralisation literature because it explains up to 70 percent or more of the variation in 
social service delivery (reflected by the R-squares of each model).  
Hausman Tests with Chi2 (10) and P. Values 116.46 (0.00), 106.88 (0.00), 
2.35(0.00), 70.41 (0.00), 38.42 (0.00), 33.74 (0.00), 56 (0.00), 40(0.00), 92(0.00) for first 
to nine models respectively allow us to select the Fixed Effect models for the final 
estimation. A major threat to validity of our outcomes could come from the time-variant 
factors that simultaneously correlate with services and the Devolution indicators, which 
may create the problem of endogeneity. This would occur if the federal and provincial 
governments‘ choices of devolution were purposely based on quality and quantity of 
social and economic indicators of localities. As the devolution plan was a nation-wide 
policy, applied to all local governments in Pakistan, endogeneity should not be a major 
issue.  
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
To garner a better theoretical understanding, we developed a legislative bargaining 
model of fiscal federalism. The model explicitly contains welfare dimension that relates 
to the pro-poor services delivery. The model shows that fiscal transfers have empowered 
sub-national governments to spend more on basic social and economic sectors. We 
empirically tested this proposition, which suggests an overall positive and statistically 
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significant relationship between decentralisation and pro-poor social services delivery. 
The empirical evidence shows that the devolution significantly changed the size and 
magnitude of social and economic investments.  
The efficacy of the decentralisation  at local level is evident much more in services 
like rural development and water management facilities than the education. This indicates 
the presence of the local elite capture on which an extensive fiscal federalism literature 
[permanent among them is Bardhan and Mookherjee (2005)] exists. That is because 
political representatives may award work on irrigation projects and other related physical 
infrastructure to locals as political patronage. 
Constraint experienced with data made it difficult to draw a definite conclusion on 
the skewness of the social service provision. The data issue also limited this research 
from measuring and analysing the quality of these services in terms of units of output 
rather than sticking only to the supply of such services measured through public 
expenditures. More research is required to investigate the effectiveness of the 
decentralisation to local level in enhancing the quality of ‗untargeted services‘ that 
potentially affect the local communities without any differentiation. Theoretically, not 
skewed and untargeted pattern of service distribution is likely to impact positively the 
poor and disadvantaged communities more  as compared to their rich counterparts. 
Moreover, the paper suggests more research to assess the impact of 18
th
 Amendment to 
the Constitution of Pakistan in 2010 on services provision that abolished concurrent list 
and subsequently devolved constitutional, administrative and economic powers to sub-
national governments.  
 
APPENDIX A 
Variables Used to Determine Sectoral Allocation of Public Resources 
1 Water and Sanitation 5 Agriculture (Agriculture Value Addition) 
2 Education (primary and Tertiary) 6 Irrigation  
3 Health (Basic Health Care) 7 Rural Development 
4 Social Security and Welfare 8 Civil Work 
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It is a decent effort discussing the effects of decentralisation on the service 
delivery. This paper focusses on Pakistan and explores the effects for its troubled history 
of decentralisation. Author touches upon a very important topic and has tried to identify 
the effects of decentralisation on certain sectors that can bring a positive change in 
people‘s life. The paper contains both the theoretical models as well as the empirical 
estimation however there are still issues that need reconsideration. Main comments as are 
follows:  
(1) Introduction offers a good collation of literature, while the historical 
background makes it obvious that the local government system in Pakistan 
was not fully functional. This clarifies why the topic presented in this paper 
has largely remained neglected in Pakistan.   
(2) Section 4 mentions nothing about the devolution plan so the title needs to be 
changed. 
(3) In the data section 5, CPI is used as a deflator; however, it would be better to 
use GDP deflator to deflate different series because the author is mainly 
dealing with aggregated data for public sector expenditures. 
(4) Furthermore, initially the paper conveys that the focus is on the third tier of 
the government but suddenly the econometric analysis is conducted at the 
provincial level instead; this is inconsistent with the initial build up of the 
paper. The author gives only four lines to justify this and assumes that 
Provincial expenditures reflect local spending. However, it can be seen at 
Table 1 (page 4), that only 40 percent of provincial proceeds are allocated to 
the districts in each province.    
(5) Devolution reform is presented with the help of a dummy variable; despite 
the initial theoretical debate that higher transfer rate will depict greater 
decentralisation. The problem with dummy variable is that it can take only 
two values i.e. ―zero‖ and ―1‖; where zero would mean no decentralisation 
that goes against the spirit of what the author wants to emphasis. Therefore, it 
would be helpful if the author can also use the conventional 
revenue/expenditure proxies to represent decentralisation to make the 
argument convincing and to get the analysis consistent with the theoretical 
section.  
(6) Furthermore, the decentralisation dummy takes the value of 1 only for the 
period 2001-2008 and zero otherwise (1975-2000). This reflects that author is 
not convinced about the earlier attempts for decentralisation. Yet again the 
conventional proxy might be more helpful than the dummy as it can 
overcome this issue. Similarly, the dummy should take value 1 after year 
2002, i.e. a completed year of the implementation of devolution plan.  
(7) This paper uses 4 different methods for estimation, however, Fixed Effects 
(FE) seems plausible as the provinces are inherently quite different from each 
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other. Moreover, the OLS with year and province dummies will represent the 
Least squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator i.e. equivalent to the 
Random effects (RE-GLS) model so there is no need for the two 
simultaneously: this is also clear from empirical results as the two regressions 
give similar results. In fact, Hausman test is basically used to help us identify 
the appropriate techniques out of RE and FE. Therefore, the authors should 
include only those results in the main text that are most appropriate. 
(8) It is surprising to see that public expenditures on health (at Table 3) has, at 
certain year taken the minimum value of zero; this needs to be checked again 
and corrected. 
(9) The dependent variables include certain sectors which are beyond the 
effective administrative control of the district governments like police, 
agriculture, irrigation etc. In fact focus should be on the most obvious social 
sector where the impact of decentralisation is most obvious, especially when 
the period under focus is so short i.e. 2002-2008. Another important matter to 
consider is that of the concurrent list which could only be liquefied in 2010; 
this puts a question mark on the analysis, questioning provincial capacity to 
make a change during the study period.  
(10) It is uncommon to use a single model to judge nine different socio-economic 
services/sectors, hence the author should rethink about it. Moreover, the 
author can use other important variables like development spending, federal 
transfers, international aid/assistance etc. to explain the provincial social 
sectors. 
(11) Lastly, the paper unnecessarily puts more weight on the federal transfers to 
proxy empowered subnational governments. Instead, whether the provincial 
revenues comes from the own source revenues or the federal transfers, in 
both the cases it will represent a financially capable/empowered sub national 
government.  
To conclude, this paper reflects the hard work done by the author; still better 
synergy should be built between the theoretical and the empirical part. Moreover, the 
empirical part needs serious reconsideration. Hence, provided that the issues in 
estimation are resolved, this paper offers a good contribution to literature. 
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